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BEYOND CARVE-OUTS AND TOWARD
RELIANCE: A NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK
FOR CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY CHOICE
OF LAW
John A. E. Pottow*
The title of this Article purports to develop a normative framework for
cross-border insolvency choice of law. That can be a task of varying scope,
so at the outset any pretense of ambition for a wholly new choice of law
model should be dispelled. Indeed, at the most generalized level,
bankruptcy choice of law theory has already been fully ventilated in the
well-rehearsed universalism versus territorialism debates.1 And it has been
settled. The universalists, at least as a normative matter, appear to have
won: choice of law, as it is increasingly accepted, should be determined by
the debtor’s center of main interests (COMI). 2 But no sooner did the
universalists claim theoretical superiority than did they bow to concessions
animated by such pragmatic concerns as reality, begetting the now-
dominant paradigm of modified universalism.3 One could argue this raises a
nomenclature question: is “modified universalism” an independent
normative theory for choice of insolvency law in cross-border proceedings
or is it merely a pragmatic gloss put on the universalist theory, which
retains the normative theoretical core?4 For purposes of this Article, I prefer
to cast modified universalism as its own normative theory. Modified
* © John A. E. Pottow, John Philip Dawson Collegiate Professor of Law, University of Michigan
Law School, 2014. Thanks to all participants at the symposium for comments and especially Pete
Osornio (Michigan J.D. Class of 2014) for research help. Ted Janger, the Center for the Study of
Business Law and Regulation at Brooklyn Law School, and the International Insolvency Institute
all get credit for the wisdom of the need for this symposium.
1. E.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, The Case for Cooperative Territoriality in International
Bankruptcy, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2216 (2000); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism in
Global Insolvencies: Choice of Law and Choice of Forum, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 457 (1991)
[hereinafter Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism].
2. See U.N. COMM. ON INT’L TRADE LAW, MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY
WITH GUIDE TO ENACTMENT AND INTERPRETATION, U.N. Sales No. E.99.V.3 (1997) [hereinafter
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW]; Council Regulation 1346/2000, On Insolvency Proceedings, art. 12,
2000 O.J. (L 160) 1 (EC) [hereinafter EU Insolvency Regulation].
3. See John A. E. Pottow, Procedural Incrementalism: A Model for International Bankruptcy,
45 VA. J. INT’L L. 935, 952 (2005) [hereinafter Pottow, Procedural Incrementalism]. Although as
others well note, universalism, “modified” enough, can dissolve into territorialism. Charles W.
Mooney, Jr., Harmonizing Choice-of-Law Rules for International Insolvency Cases: Virtual
Territoriality, Virtual Universalism, and the Problem of Local Interests, 9 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN.
& COM. L. 120, 132–35 (2014); see also Edward J. Janger, Silos: Establishing the Distributional
Baseline in Cross-Border Bankruptcies, 9 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 180, 189 (2014)
(noting that the EU proposals turn “modified universalism on its head by validating a virtual
territorial approach to distribution”) [hereinafter Janger, Silos]; Edward J. Janger, Virtual
Territoriality, 48 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 401, 418 (2010) [hereinafter Janger, Virtual
Territoriality].
4. See generally Pottow, Procedural Incrementalism, supra note 3, at 952–53 (discussing
modified universalism’s outgrowth from universalism).
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universalism is more specifically a second-order choice of law theory. It
argues that the theoretical purity of universalism is desirable as a first-order
matter, but because that purity is not yet attainable and because incremental
advancement toward universalism is preferable to failed swings for the
fences,5 a second-order approach is warranted. This second-order theory is
mindful of pragmatic constraints and counsels that it is normatively
desirable to “modify” universalism with some territorialist concessions.6
Thus, non-trivial accommodation of local law not only can but also should
be tolerated in cross-border insolvency proceedings.7
Viewed in this manner, modified universalism is a form of
incrementalism, a thus-far successful approach to cross-border insolvency
reform. As deployed in the UNCITRAL Model Law,8 chapter 15 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code, 9 and to a large degree the EU Insolvency
Regulation, 10modified universalism is more specifically an instance of
procedural incrementalism, a form of incrementalism that moves for
gradually increasing subjugation of sovereignty on seemingly less
threatening, procedural matters as a form of acclimation to the imposition
of foreign law upon (or at least foreign court control over) domestic
insolvency proceedings.11 As operationalized, the modified universalism of
these current regimes finds doctrinal outlet in a presumptive universalist
choice of law rule—COMI lex fori concursus—but which backtracks with a
series of carve-outs under which local insolvency law can apply in non-
COMI states.12 We can thus fairly characterize the present state of affairs
even more specifically as a carve-out-based regime of modified
universalism.
If this assessment is correct, that modified universalism—the stipulated
normatively superior (at present) framework for cross-border insolvency—
pursues an incremental trajectory, then the question naturally arises: what is
the next stage along this uncharted but dimly perceptible path toward fuller
and complete universalism? Specifically, which carve-outs are ready for
retirement to yield to COMI-state law? The question is not merely one of
academic interest. UNCITRAL’s Working Group V has put the issue
squarely in the crosshairs by seeking input for reforms from scholars and
practitioners alike 13 with particular focus on choice of law issues
5. See id.
6. See, e.g., Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Global Solution to Multinational Default, 98 MICH.
L. REV. 2276 (2000).
7. See, e.g., UNCITRALMODEL LAW, supra note 2, art. 28.
8. UNCITRALMODEL LAW, supra note 2.
9. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1501 et seq (2012).
10. EU Insolvency Regulation, supra note 2.
11. See Pottow, Procedural Incrementalism, supra note 3, at 952.
12. See EU Insolvency Regulation, supra note 2; 11 U.S.C. § 1501; UNCITRALMODEL LAW,
supra note 2.
13. U.N. Comm. on Int’l Trade Law, Working Group V (Insolvency Law), Rep. on its 45th
Sess., Apr. 21–25, 2014, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/803 (May 6, 2014).
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(recognizing that as just mentioned, at a grander level the universalism-
territorialism debate is already one about choice of law).14
The purpose of this Article is two-fold. First, this Article seeks to
address the third-order choice of law considerations under present debate in
answering the question of what’s next. That is, accepting universalism as a
first-order normative theory, and then accepting modified universalism as a
second-order normative theory, how might we theoretically anchor—as a
matter of normative analysis—the best way to take the next step in
reforming a carve-out-based choice of law regime? Rather than rely upon
serendipitous fits and starts, which seem to drive the field to a certain extent
in directing the vector of carve-out reform, this Article proposes a
framework based on actual, defensive litigant reliance as the third-order
theoretical principle to guide the doctrinal development within modified
universalism. Second, this Article tries to flesh out some choice of law rules
that might flow from, or at the very least be consistent with, such a reliance-
based normative framework. Because the prescriptive/evaluative aspect of
this Article builds upon current efforts, however, it is first necessary to
review the bidding of where cross-border insolvency reform has moved on
choice of law. This Article thus divides into these three parts—reviewing
the bidding, explaining the suggested framework, and assessing the current
proposals —and unfolds accordingly (with one interlude). The reader
should be forewarned before proceeding: we are deeply inside baseball
here. This is a technical paper for experts; it assumes substantial familiarity
with the subject matter of cross-border insolvency. You have been warned.
I. REVIEWING THE BIDDING: CURRENT CROSS-BORDER
INSOLVENCY CHOICE OF LAW DEVELOPMENTS
Modified universalism makes “give-backs” to territorialists in order to
garner broader acceptance of projects like the EU Insolvency Regulation
and UNCITRAL Model Law. There are two broad mechanisms through
which these territorialist give-backs manifest themselves: choice of law
carve-outs and secondary proceedings. (Technically, as the unassailable Ian
Fletcher points out,15 the former mechanism—choice of law carve-outs—
can actually divide into two analytically distinct subsets: restriction on the
scope of lex fori concursus, 16 and explicit selection of non-lex fori
14. Pottow, Procedural Incrementalism, supra note 3, at 944 (“In a critical respect, the
‘problem’ of transnational insolvencies, at least at one level, might be nothing more than an
admittedly challenging choice of law issue: whose (policy-rich) laws of distribution, priority, and
avoidance should govern the insolvency of the multi-jurisdiction debtor?” ).
15. BOB WESSELS & IAN F. FLETCHER, AM. LAW INST., Global Rules on Conflict-of-Laws
Matters in Insolvency Cases, in TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY: GLOBAL PRINCIPLES FOR
COOPERATION IN INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY CASES ann. at 200, 252–53 (2012), available at
http://www.iiiglobal.org/component/jdownloads/finish/557/5932.htm [hereinafter GP Annex].
16. E.g., EU Insolvency Regulation, supra note 2, art. 6.
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concursus for specific litigation matters, such as lex laboris. 17 While
conceptually discrete, however, these are both carve-outs from the
presumptive choice of law rule of lex fori concursus.) Let us first turn to the
latter territorialist mechanism of lex fori concursus disapplication—
secondary proceedings—in reviewing the current proposals to reform the
EU Insolvency Regulation (and cognate innovations) from a modified
universalist’s perspective.
A. SECONDARY PROCEEDINGS: A NECESSARY EVIL
Secondary proceedings, by contrast to the subject-specific choice of law
exclusion of a carve-out, are wholesale vetoes of the COMI lex fori
concursus, deploying what perhaps should be considered lex secondus.
More precisely, secondary proceedings allow application of a different
forum’s lex fori concursus upon the opening of the secondary proceeding in
the new forum. While commentators, and not without reason, have
characterized these secondary proceedings as enabling a local creditor veto
over COMI law, blackmail, etc., 18 secondary proceedings can also be
properly conceived, and perhaps even better conceived, as choice of law
carve-outs writ large (albeit contingent). That is, when (but only when) the
contingency arises that a local creditor possessing claims under local law
chooses to open a secondary proceeding, then (but only then) the COMI
state insolvency law will be presumptively displaced in favor of the local
state’s insolvency law: lex secondus. 19 (Chapter 15 allows parallel
proceedings under sections 1528–29, which are a looser form of secondary
proceedings but have the same flavor of allowing for the primacy of local
law, albeit in a territorially limited matter.)20
From a normative perspective, secondary proceedings present
something of an embarrassment to universalists. As I have argued
elsewhere, however, secondaries are a necessary evil: a pit stop on the road
17. Id. art. 10.
18. Janger, Silos, supra note 3, at 182 (describing secondary proceedings as the “functional
territorial [equivalent of] blackmail”).
19. Yes, I know, I am conflating choice of forum with choice of law. Jay Westbrook has
already admonished us to keep the two distinct, see Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism, supra
note 1, at 461 (“[T]here is a difference between choice of forum, the explicit focus of the
universalist rule, and choice of law, a result of universalism often implicitly assumed.”), and he is
right, but as I have also already admonished, choice of forum can have, at times, important and
even dispositive effects on choice of law. See John A. E. Pottow, The Maxwell Case, in
BANKRUPTCY LAW STORIES 222, 229 (Robert K. Rasmussen ed., 2007). Furthermore, local
insolvency law can choose foreign law (including COMI law) on a transaction-by-transaction
basis, as was indeed the implication ofMaxwell. In reMaxwell Commc’n Corp. plc by Homan, 93
F.3d 1036 (2d Cir. 1996).
20. 11 U.S.C. § 1528 (2012) (“The effects of such case shall be restricted to the assets of the
debtor that are within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States . . . .”); 11 U.S.C. §
1529(2)(B) (“[I]f such foreign proceeding is a foreign main proceeding, the stay and suspension
referred to in section 1520(a) shall be modified or terminated if inconsistent with the relief granted
in the United States.”).
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toward universalism that was required to secure the buy-in of skeptical
states.21 For the modified universalist, secondary proceedings should be
tolerated, but they should be slowly, in successive waves of reform,
restricted in scope.22
As a self-described universalist, I may have surprised some in seeming
not just to apologize for but to applaud secondary proceedings.
Specifically, I have endorsed the use of so-called “synthetic secondary
proceedings” to treat foreign creditor priority claims in the COMI forum “as
if” (to use Bob Wessel’s terminology)23 secondary proceedings have been
opened. 24 There are reasons for this seeming capitulation. Synthetic
secondaries are welcome in my view because they both reduce the value-
gobbling transaction costs of local proceedings and cabin the scope and
incidence (by pre-emption) of true secondary proceedings. With increasing
disuse of true secondaries will likely come increasing acceptance of COMI-
state law more generally, and so synthetic secondaries are a territorialist
step backward for a universalist leap forward. 25 Ted Janger calls these
proceedings an application of “virtual territoriality” 26 and others have
offered the even more evocative label of “virtual contractual secondary
proceedings.”27 Although we vary in our enthusiasm, we all arrive at the
same place: all agree that synthetic secondaries are better than full
secondaries (three cheers for the Collins & Aikman case, and more for
Nortel),28 but even better would be no secondaries at all.
21. John A. E. Pottow, A New Role for Secondary Proceedings in International Bankruptcies,
46 TEX. INT’L L.J. 579, 584 (2011) [hereinafter Pottow, Secondary Proceedings] (“In sum, the
most accurate understanding (from the normative perspective of a universalist) of secondary
proceedings is that they are a necessary evil. They are required to dampen territorialist and
competitive impulses.”).
22. Id. at 589 (declaring that future reform efforts should limit the scope of secondary
proceedings to real property disputes, disputes where local judicial authority is needed to exercise
equitable or other non-monetary bankruptcy-related relief, and other extraordinary circumstances
pursuant to some safety valve escape clause).
23. Bob Wessels, Contracting Out of Secondary Insolvency Proceedings: The Main
Liquidator’s Undertaking in the Meaning of Article 18 in the Proposal to Amend the EU
Insolvency Regulation, 9 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 63, 76 (2014).
24. Pottow, Secondary Proceedings, supra note 21, at 584 (“In other words, all that is
advocated is a centripedal push of the activity of putative secondary proceedings to resolution in
the COMI, without necessary change in actual outcome.”).
25. Aggressive universalist that I am, even I allow for secondary proceedings for certain
matters such as in rem real property disputes, equitable proceedings under local law, etc. Id.
26. Janger, Virtual Territoriality, supra note 3.
27. Michael Menjucq & Reinhard Dammann, Regulation No. 1346/2000 on Insolvency
Proceedings: Facing the Companies Group Phenomenon, 9 BUS. L. INT’L. 145, 154 (2008) (using
the phrase “virtual contractual secondary proceedings” to describe the practice of providing
creditors the same treatment as if secondary proceedings had been opened).
28. Re Collins & Aikman Europe SA, [2006] EWHC (Ch) 1343; Re Nortel Networks SA &
ORS, [2009] EWHC (Ch) 206.
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B. SECONDARY PROCEEDINGS: DOUBLINGDOWN ON EVIL?
Taking secondary proceedings as here for now, the current wave of EU
reform—the proposals to amend the Regulation (ping-ponging back and
forth between the EU Commission, Council, and Parliament) 29—builds
upon the assumption these proceedings will remain part of the procedural
landscape for some time. The amendments, however, seek to “drastically”
change the way secondary proceedings are to be used,30 but in a way that
might give a universalist heartburn, namely, by expanding their incidence.
Initially, this sounds like bad news for the modified universalist, but upon
reflection the expansion as proposed should be encouraged. First,
expanding the use of secondaries to non-liquidation purposes means that if
the (normatively regrettable) local law veto is exercised, it at least need not
lead to the winding up of the multinational subsidiary.31 Second, and more
importantly, the expansion of the powers of the primary liquidator
(insolvency representative) strengthens the notion of what I have called
“jurisdictional hierarchy,” by expressly increasing the domains in which the
COMI officer has dominance over the secondary proceeding officers,
especially in corporate group proceedings.32 For example, the first right to
propose a group-wide plan of reorganization vested in the COMI officer
mirrors the U.S. chapter 11 concept of exclusivity that is specifically
designed to empower debtors-in-possession in the domestic reorganization
context.33 Third, and perhaps most exciting from a theoretical perspective,
the recitals from the EU amendments contain all sorts of language (albeit in
the maddening, compromise-laden generalities that constitute legal Euro-
speak) that recognize the ugly side of secondary proceedings. Thus, while
there is still some encomium about the grand importance of protecting local
creditors, there is also candid assessment that secondary proceedings can
“hamper” reorganizations.34
29. See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending
Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 on Insolvency Proceedings, COM (2012) 744 final (Dec.
12, 2012) [hereinafter Proposal]; Draft Report on the Proposal for a Regulation of the European
Parliament and of the Council Amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 on Insolvency
Proceedings, COM (2012) 0744 (Dec. 20, 2012) (Parliament Draft Report).
30. Wessels, supra note 23, at 87.
31. Proposal, supra note 29, para. 5 (“[T]he requirement that secondary proceedings must be
winding-up proceedings should be abolished.”).
32. Pottow, Secondary Proceedings, supra note 21, at 583.
33. Proposal, supra note 29, para. 45, art. 42(d)(1)(c) (empowering the liquidator with the
right “to propose a rescue plan . . . for all or some members of the group for which insolvency
proceedings have been opened and to introduce it into any of the proceedings opened with respect
to another member of the same group”); 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b) (2012) (“Except as otherwise
provided in this section, only the debtor may file a plan until after 120 days after the date of the
order for relief under this chapter.”).
34. Proposal, supra note 29, para. 12, recital 19(a) (noting that the opening of secondary
proceedings can “hamper the efficient administration of the estate”).
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C. SUMMARY: DUBIOUSREFORM IN SEARCH OF ANORMATIVE
ANCHOR
Assessing the direction of the circulating EU amendments from a
modified universalist perspective leads to a middling but passing grade
regarding the change in the role of secondary proceedings. True, the recitals
starting to call out the potential evils of secondaries are a step in the right
direction, but some disappointments remain. At the most basic level,
secondaries persist as an instantiation of choice of law veto. Additionally,
and perhaps more importantly, there does not seem to be serious movement
in the choice of law provisions; none of the amendments confronts the issue
of the carve-outs from lex fori concursus. And most troublingly from the
vantage of this Article’s ambitions, there is no apparent normative compass
guiding these reforms. That is, for synthetic secondaries, the report simply
recognizes generalized feedback from respondents to questionnaires
expressing “dissatisfaction” with secondary proceedings; 35 it cites the
success of Collins & Aikman as a workaround,36 but then shies away from
striking a new path guided by a strong normative vision. Rather, the
amendments seem to have restricted their changes to secondary proceedings
(and other choice of law provisions) to the level of housekeeping: necessary
and deft cleanups, to be sure, but nothing moving the ball forward in any
significantly normative way. 37 This restricted scope is perhaps not
surprising given the touchiness with which choice of law gets treated in
insolvency. Consider the voluminous Legislative Guide (LG) propounded
by UNCITRAL.38 While generally not bashful about offering prescriptive
recommendations for domestic insolvency laws for countries seeking to
update their regimes (including such micromanagement as spelling out
super-majoritarian voting rules in reorganization proceedings), 39 the LG
does not touch choice of law with a ten-foot pole, other than meekly
suggesting that if countries want to persist in having priority payment
provisions for preferred creditors in local law, they should minimize those
unwelcome attributes of a bankruptcy law regime.40
35. Id. at 4 (noting that “half of the respondents were dissatisfied with the coordination
between main and secondary proceedings.”).
36. Id. at 7.
37. I know, housekeeping was essentially the scope of its mandate, id. at 3 (noting that, after
consultation with stakeholders and receipt of results of studies, improving efficiency was the
primary objective of the revision of the Insolvency Regulation), so I’m not blaming the
technocrats here—in fact, I think they did a great technocratic job. Ten points for Ravenclaw.
38. U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON INSOLVENCY
LAW, U.N. Sales No. E.05.V.10 (2005) [hereinafter UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVEGUIDE].
39. Id. recs. 145–151.
40. Id. rec. 187 (“The insolvency law should minimize the priorities accorded to unsecured
claims.”). I would translate this into more direct speech thus: “We all know they’re just gravy
trains for favored local lobbies, so if you have no shame and include them in your bankruptcy
laws, at least be discreet about it and don’t do it too much.”
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D. FUMBLING TOWARDNORMATIVITY: THEGLOBAL PRINCIPLES
ANNEX
All of this discussion should lead the knowledgeable reader to want to
explore the Global Principles Annex (GP Annex), with its comparatively
ambitious agenda for a choice of law regime to supplement the EU
Insolvency Regulation. 41 There, carve-outs abound as the modified
universalist approach to choice of law.42 The GP Annex is certainly a bold
innovation, but at the same time it too is unnecessarily timid in its embrace
of modified universalism. That is, by its own terms, it worries that perhaps
the provisions of EU Insolvency Regulation, and certainly the choice of law
suggestions in the LG, are too universalist for international rollout, having
too few carve-outs from COMI insolvency law for the Reporters’ comfort.43
In that sense, the GP Annex is a theoretical step backward.44 Indeed, this
reveals the greatest risk with an incrementalist reform system (procedural or
otherwise). The glass half full narrative is that modest reforms will tear
down sovereign mistrust and participant-actors’ skepticism of the evils of
applying foreign insolvency law. The half empty narrative, however, is that
these modest reforms will get readily enacted with self-congratulatory back-
slapping but then stall without further progress when the truly difficult
sovereignty concessions have to be made (e.g., selection of priority and
distribution rules).45 Worse, “critical carve-out mass” might be reached that
encourages protectionist-minded lobbyists to seek to add their own carve-
outs into the mix, resulting in rent-seeking chaos and the loss of any
universalist core.46
Viewed from the half empty perspective, it is easy to dismiss the GP
Annex as “just a bunch of carve-outs” and bemoan its increased carve-out
usage when compared with other instruments. But that would be a mistake.
Carefully analyzed, the carve-outs have a common normative thread.
Indeed, the painstakingly crafted Comments and Reporters’ Notes to each
41. GP Annex, supra note 15, Statement of the Reporters.
42. E.g., id. r. 19–21 cmt. (“Based on perceived impressions of the importance of certain social
policies and on several high-profile court cases, the Reporters believe that a [carve-out] rule of
global application should be proposed with regard to current contracts of employment in case of
the insolvency of the employer.”).
43. Id. Statement of the Reporters (“With respect, the Reporters consider that so limited a
range of exceptions to the dominant role of the lex concursus is unlikely to prove commercially
convenient or acceptable to the majority of parties engaged in international trade and business,
given the present stage of uneven development of national laws governing such sensitive matters
as security interests, set-off, and transaction avoidance.”).
44. Of course, the Reporters will fairly retort that they score a huge victory in scope—the
intended reach of the GP Annex is to be universal, not just European—and so it can be argued that
with wider scope and exposure to more diverse legal systems comes a necessary reduction in
ambition regarding acceptance of universalist choice of law principles.
45. See Pottow, Procedural Incrementalism, supra note 3, at 1012 (“[I]t might well be that as
the cession of sovereignty gets increasingly painful, states will reach a balking point.”).
46. As an example, see The Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. § 6(d) (2013), enacted as
11 U.S.C. § 365(n).
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Rule in the GP Annex demonstrate that the drafters were trying to anchor
each carve-out in a justified principle of insolvency or commercial law
policy.47 The proposal of this Article is to draw that common normative
thread out into the open and propose a unifying theme. Thus, this Article
contends that the better approach is to use this normative vision to guide
from the top-down an analysis of which, if any, carve-outs should exist
from a strong lex fori concursus rule in a modified universalist regime,
rather than justify which, if any, current carve-outs are theoretically
defensible from a bottoms-up, issue-by-issue approach.48
II. PROPOSED NORMATIVE FOCUS: PROTECTING
DEFENSIVE RELIANCE INTERESTS.
As a clarifying reminder, the normative focus proposed in this next
section presupposes a modified universalist insolvency regime. That is, the
most top-level normative framework is stipulated to be universalism; the
transactional gains and operational simplicity are taken as givens in need of
no further theoretical defense.49 But the modified universalist system allows
clawback from this ideal, and as currently operationalized, that clawback is
by way of carve-outs. Thus, the “lower-level” focus of this normative
discussion is how best to design and identify the appropriate carve-outs.
A. FIRST PRINCIPLES: PARTYRELIANCE
As a starting point, then, we might blend the normative into the
descriptive and examine the current carve-outs of the status quo (at least the
status quo of current reform proposals). Looking at Rules 15 through 23 of
the GP Annex that permit carve-outs to the lex fori concursus, such as “in
rem” (security); 50 labor contracts; 51 set-off defenses; 52 and voidable
transactions, 53 it is submitted that a common theme of reliance can be
divined. For example, the avoidance carve-outs protect the party accused of
a voidable transaction’s defense to avoidance available under local law.54
The presumed reliance of a local worker to the protections accorded under
domestic insolvency law is similarly vindicated.55 Broadening the focus of
reliance to ex ante business expectations, it can also be argued (at least
plausibly) that secured lenders equally rely upon the insolvency protections
47. GP Annex, supra note 15, cmts. passim.
48. The GP Annex takes a bottoms-up approach under this taxonomy.
49. See, e.g., Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 1, at 466; Lucian Arye Bebchuk
& Andrew T. Guzman, An Economic Analysis of Transnational Bankruptcies, 42 J.L. & ECON.
775 (1999).
50. GP Annex, supra note 15, r. 15.
51. Id. r. 20.
52. Id. r. 17.
53. Id. r. 22.
54. Id.
55. Id. r. 20.
2014] Beyond Carve-Outs and Toward Reliance 211
of transaction-state law regarding rights upon default.56 Thus, the carve-outs
from strict application of lex fori concursus can each, to a greater or lesser
extent, be justified as protecting this “local law reliance interest.” This
should not be a provocative position; the Reporters themselves frequently
cite reliance interests in their commentary.57
Accordingly, I propose that rather than have a reliance tail wagging the
choice of law carve-out dog, we should promote reliance to the status of
dog proper: reliance should become the necessary and (nearly) exclusive
justification for a choice of law carve-out. That is, a more theoretically pure
approach to insolvency choice of law would be to have a global rule that
whenever a party to a transaction actually and reasonably relies upon the
provisions of domestic insolvency law, that substantive law should govern
resolution of an insolvency-related dispute. That pure a rule, however, is
unlikely to come about. Even setting aside administrability concerns for
present discussion, such a party-focused rule would be a radical departure
from the interest-focused analysis of modern choice of law rules in many
legal systems.58 Indeed, it even seems like a reversion to the vested rights
approach of a bygone era, 59 perhaps prompting concern by private
international law scholars that this would be the worst of all possible
worlds.60
Let me nevertheless defend this seemingly provocative normative
stance from such global attack. First, “contacts”—really, state-based
reliance interests—are not the proper reliance interests that should be
protected in insolvency choice of law rules. (In earlier work, I have argued
for a general carve-out in favor of local state insolvency law as a bone to
throw to territorialists in the truest pragmatic spirit of modified
56. Id. r. 15–16 cmt. (“The extent to which the rights of a secured creditor are capable of being
affected by the debtor’s insolvency is an essential aspect of the creditor’s assessment of the net
risk to which he is exposed, and can have a significant bearing upon the decision whether to
extend credit, and if so, on what terms.”).
57. Id. Statement of the Reporters (describing the “enhanced certainty and predictability of . . .
outcomes” as “a worthwhile goal”).
58. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971) (articulating a “most
significant contacts” test); see also id. cmt. c (articulating the principle that the law of the
jurisdiction with the “most significant relationship” to a dispute should govern).
59. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 1 (1934).
60. See, e.g., J.H.C. Morris, Law and Reason Triumphant, or How Not to Review a
Restatement, 21 AM. J. COMP. L. 322, 330 (1973) (calling the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts
“the most impressive, comprehensive and valuable work on the conflict of laws that has ever been
produced in any country, in any language, at any time.”). However, the Restatement (Second) has,
much as its predecessor, faced considerable criticism. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens
of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L.
REV. 249, 253 (1992) (“Trying to be all things to all people, [the Restatement (Second) of
Conflicts] produced mush.”); Symeon C. Symeonides, The Need for A Third Conflicts
Restatement (and A Proposal for Tort Conflicts), 75 IND. L.J. 437, 448 (2000) (“Courts need and
are entitled to more guidance than either the Second Restatement or the iconoclastic literature of
the last two decades have provided.”).
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universalism, 61 but here I am engaging in a more theoretically pure
analysis.) Indeed, state interests are already well protected in the standard
escape clause public policy exceptions within the universalist choice of law
regimes,62 so it is hardly fair to suggest that party-focused reliance leaves
state public policies out in the cold. Second, as will be revealed below, I am
not necessarily against “presumed” party reliance as a back-door protection
of state interests in certain policy-sensitive areas, such as labor rights, that
have traditionally bedeviled multinational insolvency proposals.63 (Some
might label this a fudge, and there may be some force to that criticism, but I
will counter their purity with pragmatism.) Accordingly, I am trying to
capture the fairness-oriented concerns undergirding some, if not all, of the
GP Annex exceptions in suggesting that party reliance—and not state
reliance—should be elevated to become the proper focus of attention in
crafting choice of insolvency law carve-out rules within a modified
universalist system.
B. SECOND PRINCIPLES: DEFENSIVERELIANCE
Even if the theoretical purity of an exclusively reliance-based choice of
law regime could overcome pragmatism objections, it would still encounter
challenges based on the multi-party nature of bankruptcy law. Consider, for
example, avoidance law. Creditor A, recipient of a voidable preference
under COMI-state law, pleads that under the private international law rules
of her state the obligation would be covered by home-state law, and under
home-state law she has an absolute defense to avoidance. The GP Annex
accommodates this “defendant reliance” by exempting the application of
COMI state avoidance law to “save” the defendant from liability and
thereby protect A’s legitimate legal expectations.64 An intrinsic fallacy with
this approach, however, is a vividness focus on A’s interest to the extent of
61. John A. E. Pottow, Greed and Pride in International Bankruptcy: The Problems of and
Proposed Solutions to “Local Interests”, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1899, 1939 (2006) [hereinafter
Pottow, Greed and Pride].
62. E.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1506 (2012) (“Nothing in this chapter prevents the court from refusing to
take an action governed by this chapter if the action would be manifestly contrary to the public
policy of the United States.”).
63. See EU Insolvency Regulation, supra note 2, rec. 11 (noting that the varying views on
rights in rem and contracts of employment make it impractical to introduce insolvency
proceedings that are universal in scope).
64. The GP Annex contains three examples demonstrating the application of Global Rules 22
and 23. Two of those examples illustrate how the GP Annex “saves” creditors who rely on a
certain state’s law from the application of COMI law. GP Annex, supra note 15, r. 22–23 cmt.,
Reporters’ Notes. Example (a) is the quintessential example of a creditor who relies on local law
being saved from the application of COMI law by the GP Annex. Example (c) provides an
example of how the GP Annex saves a creditor who structures a transaction relying on usage of
trade, rather than local law. By contrast, example (b) illustrates how the GP Annex does not
“save” creditors who do not rely on either local law or usage of trade. Instead, the GP Annex
dictates that COMI law should apply if the only motive for structuring a transaction is to avoid the
application of avoidance law.
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diffuse-parties B through Z’s interests, represented by a bankruptcy trustee,
liquidator, etc. Creditors B through Z surely have a fair retort that under
COMI law they legitimately expect a bankruptcy estate will not be unfairly
depleted by transactions of the sort that A just protected. Yet the GP Annex,
following all major reforms to date, protects A at the expense of B through
Z in the name of reliance.
The vividness (or perhaps salience) bias of concentrated losses versus
diffuse gains is not hard to understand in the realm of voidable transactions:
the creditor who writes the cheque back to the bankruptcy estate smarts; the
other creditors, whose unsecured dividend increases marginally as a result,
may barely notice. To be sure, some gains are too diffuse to count: when a
criminal defendant’s rights are violated securing a wrongful conviction, we
generally do not talk about the diffuse gain received by having someone
dangerous off the street. The real question, then, for bankruptcy, is not just
what a given party relies upon in arranging its legal affairs, but whether that
expectation is concentrated enough that it warrants special protection in the
face of countervailing antithetical expectations of myriad other parties that
will necessarily be compromised. Thus, mere incantations of “reliance,” on
their own, cannot suffice to justify automatic legal protection; more
searching scrutiny is required.
To help sort the types of reliance and find those sufficiently special to
warrant choice of law protection in bankruptcy, a subsidiary consideration
might be deployed: whether the expectation should be considered
“affirmative” or “defensive.” Let us revisit the sympathy one might have
toward the voidable preference defendant.65 It is not just the concentration
of loss upon the party that inclines us to offer protection but also the fact
that it is a loss and not a gain. To be sure, technically this is swapping one
cognitive bias (vividness) for another (endowment). But the law, perhaps to
the lament of economists, privileges loss aversion in all sorts of ways that
differ from gain protection. 66 I build happily upon that scaffolding in
submitting that the sympathy accorded a voidable transaction recipient
might markedly exceed that accorded, say, a secured transaction lender who
was “legitimately expecting” State A’s law to allow it to have unqualified
priority in insolvency and who would be disappointed to find that an
insolvency proceeding under (COMI) State B’s law might surcharge that
priority. The loss of a potential priority seems a different order of
expectation to protect than being tagged with civil liability to disgorge a
65. Preference recipients are especially sympathetic under U.S. law because of their lack of
culpability. See 11 U.S.C. § 547 (voiding preference transfers under a strict liability regime).
66. See, e.g., Eyal Zamir, Loss Aversion and the Law, 65 VAND. L. REV. 829 (2012) (noting,
for example, how the loss-focused law of tort gives rise to greater remedies than the law of unjust
enrichment and how the Constitution’s Takings Clause limits the government’s power to take
property without just compensation while no provision limits the government’s power to confer
benefits).
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“wrongful” transaction. We can thus conceive the use of reliance
expectations in choice of law as a sword as being categorically different
from their use as a shield, perhaps inclining us to protect the latter more
than the former.67
Accordingly, a focus on “defensive” reliance can help solve an
especially prevalent reliance question in the bankruptcy context: whose
reliance? But that theoretical starting point is still not enough; the idea also
needs to be implemented. That implementation can take several forms. At
the cleanest level, if one wants to operationalize a defensive reliance-based
normative framework for choice of law in the most theoretically pure
manner, one could simply abolish all the carve-outs from COMI law that
seem to grasp around reliance justifications and replace them with an
omnibus reliance exception. To wit, global application of COMI law could
be tempered by a freestanding exception as follows: “Any party who has
actually and reasonably relied upon local insolvency law in conducting its
affairs with the debtor shall not be subjected to the application of the
COMI-state’s insolvency law.” This straightforward rule would not only
adhere more directly to the normative principles I contend (rightly)
undergird the present carve-outs but also have the additional attraction of
drafting simplicity. Relaxing the need for theoretical purity, however, I
might reject such a blanket rule and instead use the principle of defensive
litigant reliance as a “framework” to guide further movement along the
paths already blazed by current international insolvency instruments, such
as the EU amendments or GP Annex. Path dependency has its virtues, and
modified universalism, by definition, recognizes the desirability of
pragmatics over purity.
In Part IV, infra, I will suggest where such a framework leads, but
first we must detour briefly to a reconsideration of the merits of so-called
“bankruptcy contractualism.” This is not an indulgence. It is a discussion
that is necessitated by the Article’s proposed normative refocus of cross-
border insolvency law onto reliance.
III. INTERLUDE: CONTRACTUALISM RECONSIDERED
If a normatively desirable approach to choice of insolvency law rules
involves protecting legitimate party expectation, we run squarely into the
world of contractualism, which espouses allowing parties freedom to
67. This example is not perfect. From the perspective of the disappointed secured creditor,
there has been a “loss” of expected entitlement, but that loss still does not rise to the level of the
disgorged preference recipient. Perhaps a better analogy might be that of the disappointed
unsecured creditor who cajoled a trustee into pursuing a preference action that is subsequently
abandoned. That “loss” clearly does not engage the same endowment concerns of the preference
recipient’s disgorgement.
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choose their own bankruptcy law regime.68 Assuming that such party choice
is permissible (i.e., the contra-indicating policy concerns are put to rest),69
then we have given away the choice of law farm. That is, if parties to a
transaction have agreed contractually that the law, including the insolvency
law, of State C will apply to any dispute arising out of a loan, then the
COMI state’s law in insolvency proceedings is rendered irrelevant. This is
not a problem if what we truly care about under our normative framework is
protecting these parties’ legitimate expectations. In other words, it is
difficult to adopt a normative approach to insolvency choice of law that
centers on reliance without taking a stand (and presumably a strongly
supportive one) on the merits of contractualism.
Increasingly unfettered party autonomy in choice of law contracts is
clearly gaining ascendency.70 Furthermore, in the international commercial
context, courts have been especially permissive to forum selection clauses.71
Accordingly, it seems the anti-contractualist has an uphill battle in cabining
the scope of free party choice between sophisticated legal actors of
governing legal law. On the other hand, and for similar reasons to those
discussed in the preceding section, the unique multi-party context of
insolvency draws into sharp relief the very problem with extending the
presumptively free governing force of party-selected choice of law clauses:
insolvency is not just a proceeding between the parties to a contract.
Bankruptcy involves many other parties not at the contracting table.
Consider the example of a bank and debtor who agree to structure their loan
subject to a choice of law rule that the insolvency law of State X, which
subordinates tort claims, will apply. Both debtor and bank will happily
lower the cost of credit at the expense of the non-present (and perhaps not-
yet-existent) tort victims.72
American insolvency law guards against this concern of two parties’
control over the fate of the many, for example, by invalidating certain ex
ante agreements to waive the automatic stay upon filing bankruptcy.73 Such
68. See, e.g., Robert K. Rasmussen, Resolving Transnational Insolvencies Through Private
Ordering, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2252 (2000).
69. For a discussion of countervailing concerns, see John A. E. Pottow, The Myth (and
Realities) of Forum Shopping in Transnational Insolvency, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 785, 816 (2007)
(pointing out that contractualism is systematically biased in favor of those creditors “likely to
have, process, and credit-adjust to [] notice and [against] those likely to not”).
70. Regulation 593/2008, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on
the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, 2008 O.J. (L 177) 6 (EC); Regulation 864/2007,
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the Law Applicable to Non-
Contractual Obligations, 2007 O.J. (L 199) 40 (EC).
71. M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972); Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v.
Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
72. See Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy Primitives, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 219, 243 (2004)
(noting that shareholders and lenders can externalize risk on nonconsensual creditors and arguing
that such creditors be given priority above even secured creditors).
73. E.g., Farm Credit of Cent. Florida, ACA v. Polk, 160 B.R. 870, 873 (M.D. Fla. 1993); In
re Sky Grp. Int’l, Inc., 108 B.R. 86, 89 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989) (“To grant a creditor relief from
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agreements between the debtor and a lender, courts reason, cannot bind the
bankruptcy trustee, because the trustee enjoys the protection of the stay for
the protection of all creditors.
The GP Annex takes some good first steps to curb this potential for
mischief by requiring some “connection” between State X and the parties to
the loan. 74 As a practical matter, however, such connection is easy to
concoct in a modern age. 75 Thus, unless a truly restrictive test for
“connections” is set up—which is possible doctrinally, although not yet
proposed—then the (utilitarian) policymaker has to confront the difficult
task of weighing the benefits of vindication of party choice against the costs
of third-party exclusion.76
Three observations flow from and should guide resolution of this
tension. First, if categorical exclusions can correctly anticipate ex ante all
potentials for third-party abuse, then a free contractual choice regime can be
defended. For example, Barry Adler has endorsed a system of bankruptcy
contractualism with the precondition that all tort creditors have automatic
priority for preferred distribution. 77 Second, vindicating party choice of
forum and/or governing law need not be an all-or-nothing proposition.
stay simply because the debtor elected to waive the protection afforded the debtor by the
automatic stay ignores the fact that it also is designed to protect all creditors and to treat them
equally. The orderly liquidation procedure contemplated by the Code would be placed in jeopardy,
especially where (as here) none of the creditors who brought the involuntary petition was a party
to the Agreement in which debtor allegedly waived its right to the automatic stay.”).
74. E.g., GP Annex, supra note 15, r. 16.1 (making Rule 15 on Secured Creditors inapplicable
if the state where the assets are situated has no substantial relationship to the parties or the
transaction); r. 18 (making Rule 17 on Set-off inapplicable if the law of the state chosen by the
parties has no substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction); r. 23 (making Rule 22 on
Defenses to Avoidance of Detrimental Acts inapplicable if proof is provided that the state whose
law that applies has no “substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction”).
75. The European Parliament attempted to address this concern in insolvency cases involving
groups by proposing a presumption that allows the application of a certain state’s law when a
group member or members existing in that state contribute at least ten percent to the consolidated
balance-sheet total and consolidated turnover. European Parliament, Comm. on Legal Affairs,
Report on the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
Amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 on Insolvency Proceedings, amend. 26(ja)(ii),
(COM(2012)0744 – C7-0413/2012 – 2012/0360(COD)) (Nov. 9, 2013) [hereinafter Parliament
Report].
76. Even this analysis sidesteps the administrability concerns of multi-creditor negotiations.
For a sobering analysis, see Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Contracting Out of
Bankruptcy: An Empirical Intervention, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1197 (2005).
77. Adler, supra note 72, at 243; see also Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor’s Choice: A Menu
Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 TEX. L. REV. 51, 67 (1992) (“The question of the
appropriate treatment of nonconsensual claimants when a firm is insolvent is the subject of a rich
literature. This Article does not, and need not, enter this debate. Rather, once policymakers decide
the optimal treatment of nonconsensual creditors, this treatment should be unalterable by any debt
contract. In other words, the priority status of tort claimants should not depend on which
bankruptcy option a firm selects. Thus, a bankruptcy regime consisting primarily of default rules
can readily accommodate the existence of nonconsensual claimants.”); cf. Henry Hansmann &
Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J.
1879 (1991) (arguing against even shareholder limited liability where plaintiff is tort victim).
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Consider, for example, family law contracts (antenuptial, postnuptial, etc.).
For some of the same reasons as insolvency law (implication of the rights of
non-contracting third parties, i.e., children),78 many domestic systems will
give only presumptive—not dispositive—weight to the parties’
contractually expressed preferences for legal distributions. 79 A similar
presumption-based approach to contractualism could be deployed in multi-
national insolvency to see if the hypothetically exploited tort victim actually
arises in any given case. Third, harkening back to the distinction earlier
about parties’ expectations serving as either a sword or a shield, choice of
law rules could be otherwise less solicitous to party choice involving
preferred distribution (swords) to ones involving defensive protections from
liability (shields). 80 This third point blends with the second point to
underscore that a “looser” approach to vindicating party expectation as
expressed through contracted choice of law clauses can indeed be
justified—even in a context of extra-party concerns.
IV. DEPLOYING A RELIANCE-BASED CHOICE OF LAW
FRAMEWORK.
Earlier I proposed how a theoretically pure reliance-based choice of law
principle might be implemented as a categorical rule. Now it is time, as
modified universalism commands, to relax the commitment to theoretical
purity and build upon the incrementalist path already laid out by prior
78. Allison A. Marston, Planning for Love: The Politics of Prenuptial Agreements, 49 STAN.
L. REV. 887, 898 (1997) (“The most common types of provisions that courts have held invalid
contravening public policy concern children, including waiver of child support, custody, or
visitation rights.”); see, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:2-35 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Sess.) (“A
premarital or pre-civil union agreement shall not adversely affect the right of a child to support.”);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-36d (West, Westlaw through 2014 Sess.) (“The right of a child to
support may not be adversely affected by a premarital agreement. Any provision relating to the
care, custody and visitation or other provisions affecting a child shall be subject to judicial review
and modification.”).
79. For example, in the United Kingdom, prenuptial agreements are not legally binding.
Courts retain broad discretion to distribute family assets as they see fit, so as to bring about
fairness between the couple. Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973, c. 18, §§ 23–24 (U.K.). A prenup is
merely one of the factors the court will take into account when distributing assets. Id. § 7. Similar
issues arise regarding forum selection clauses. See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22
(1988) (viewing enforcement not as a question of contract formation, but instead as a question of
whether the action should be transferred from a noncontractual forum to the contractual forum
depending upon the factors outlined in the transfer of venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012),
namely, convenience of parties and witnesses and “the interest of justice”).
80. This final point may need some unpacking. A contract necessarily involves at least two
actors, and so one party’s shield may be another’s sword. My thinking here is that parties might
structure a transaction to provide protection from avoidance under (appropriate) local law.
Accordingly, a logical extension of the argument advanced in this Article regarding the role
reliance should play in choice of cross-border insolvency law is that a general theory of
bankruptcy contractualism should be embraced. So long as “embraced” allows cautious
application of the principles derived from the theory and not a full-throated commitment to “the
contract trumps all,” then this Article’s author approves and endorses the logical extension of this
Article’s arguments!
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efforts in the field. We can go through some of the current carve-outs, such
as those relating to set-offs and labor laws, both to see how they fare under
our reliance-focused framework and to make appropriate remedial
recommendations as needed.
A. SET-OFF
To start, let us consider the case of set-off. After a comprehensive
discussion, the Reporters of the GP Annex adopted the exception from lex
fori concursus for a local state set-off law in circumstances when set-off is
allowed by the passive claim’s law. 81 This is basically a defendant-
protective position based on reliance. Note that other approaches could have
been proposed that would vindicate different policies. For example, one
could have proposed allowing a set-off only if both COMI law and local
law allow for set-off. This would be considered a “debtor-protective” stance
(or, equally, an “anti-set-off” stance); both of those positions can be
justified normatively as a matter of policy, but not on the reliance grounds
advanced here. Similarly, one could have suggested allowing a set-off if
either COMI or local law allows. While promoting a plausible normative
policy (maximal creditor self-help in bankruptcy), this approach similarly
cannot be said to follow reliance vindication.
Against this backdrop, it might be assumed that the GP Annex set-off
exception scores well on this Article’s proposed framework. It does, but it
also does not. First, the positive: by focusing on the defendant’s local law,82
the exception properly restricts itself to the domain of “protective”
expectations, which vindicates defensive reliance. The reason for
withholding full marks, however, is that the carve-out assumes that the
creditor has, in fact, relied on that local law (or, even more precisely,
assumes that the creditor relied upon the non-application of COMI law in
lending to the debtor). While of course administrability concerns might
justify an approach of such presumed reliance, a modified universalist
should want to minimize carve-outs as much as possible to maximize the
reach of COMI-law rule.83 Accordingly, a better approach would be one
that allows defenses to COMI law not when they are presumed, but only
when they are actually needed. This might be considered “calling the
reliance bluff” of the putative setter-off. Indeed, this consideration is
already cogently mentioned in the Reporters’ notes, where they ask whether
set-off should be allowed upon its entitlement under passive claim law or
81. GP Annex, supra note 15, r. 17.
82. I realize this discussion frames set-off as an attack on a defendant. Of course, it could also
be characterized as a privilege accorded the setter-off. I think it is nevertheless fair to think of an
offsetting creditor as resisting payment of its claim to the estate and hence as a putative defendant.
(If not, the analysis of this discussion can be carried over to preference recipients.)
83. Pottow, Secondary Proceedings, supra note 21, at 588–89.
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whether there should be a further requirement that the party invoking set-
off must show that such a right has formed part of its legitimate
expectations arising in the context of the lending relationship between the
creditor and the insolvent debtor, so as to have been part of the calculation
of risk during the process of becoming a creditor on the terms agreed.84
Yes, of course it should. The setter-off is the one who wants the Get-Out-
of-COMI-Free Card; let the burden lie accordingly.85
Thus, a better rule under the suggested normative framework of this
Article would be to amend Rule 17 of the GP Annex to read something like
this for the conditions of allowing set-off: “If set-off is permitted by the law
applicable to the insolvent debtor’s claim and the party with the right to set-
off demonstrates it relied upon the application of that law to the exclusion
of the law of the state of the main insolvency proceeding in lending to the
debtor.” For those tut-tutting on administrability grounds that such an
approach necessarily draws a fact-intensive debate into each set-off claim, I
threaten them with offering an alternative reformulation that is less likely to
ground viable litigation: “and the offsetting party demonstrates it was
unaware of the debtor’s COMI.” That way, the truly “local” creditors who
are purportedly unsophisticated in dealing with multinational conglomerates
would get a pass, but the rest would be bound by the Gebhard maxim of
when you do business with a foreign company, you know you’re getting
yourself into foreign law.86 In the spirit of incrementalism, if the alternative
proposal is deemed too aggressive for the present state of affairs, consider it
a negotiating anchor to make the primary proposal seem more reasonable!
More seriously, if we want to circumscribe normatively well grounded rules
doctrinally by functional considerations—an eminently sensible impulse—
then such “cut-offs” should not just be expeditious (e.g., no carve-out for
84. GP Annex, supra note 15, r. 17–18 cmt.
85. I am unapologetic that this apparently reverses the British Parliament’s statutory semi-
overruling of Forster v. Wilson, (1843) 152 Eng. Rep. 1165. In Forster, one Wilson was in debt to
a bank that had gone bankrupt. He acquired several classes of £5 notes payable from the bank to
the bearer. Some of the notes were from customers on account of antecedent debt and other notes
provided that “the defendants were to pay so much only as they should receive from the assignees
. . . .” Wilson argued that he had a right to set-off for all classes of notes. The Court held that
Wilson and his co-defendants possessed the latter class of notes solely as trustees for third parties.
In essence, they themselves had not relied on the notes. The purpose of the right of set-off, the
court said, is to do “substantial justice” between the parties, “where a debt is really due from the
bankrupt to the debtor to his estate.” In this case, the court found the latter classes of notes were
not debts that were due since the defendants were to pay only as much as they received. Since
there was no reliance, the defendants did not have a right of set-off as to those notes. When it
enacted a set-off statute, Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, § 323 (Eng.), the British Parliament allowed
for the assignment of claims while eschewing the analysis of the court in Forster. Cf. Stein v.
Blake, [1996] A.C. 243 (declaring that the right of set-off is automatic and self-executing).
86. Canada S. Ry. Co. v. Gebhard, 109 U.S. 527, 537 (1883) (“[E]very person who deals with
a foreign corporation impliedly subjects himself to such laws of the foreign government, affecting
the powers and obligations of the corporation with which he voluntarily contracts, as the known
and established policy of that government authorizes.”).
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creditors whose names begin with “P”), but should be guided by principles
themselves furthering the higher-level ideal (here, universalism). In this
specific instance, therefore, one could respond to concerns of excessive
litigation with an evidentiary presumption. Given the universalist reluctance
toward carve-outs, in this case that presumption could be that the defendant
did not rely on local law. (If that rule were thought to be too broad, further
tweaks could be added: e.g., a presumption of no local law reliance for a
creditor whose COMI is outside the local jurisdiction, a counter-
presumption of local law reliance for a creditor who conducts business
solely within the local jurisdiction, etc.).
In sum, the GP Annex carve-out for set-off is consistent with this
Article’s framework; to be fully consonant, however, it should include an
actual reliance test.
B. LABOR LAW
Labor law presents a different challenge, because here it is harder to
justify a lex fori concursus carve-out from an expectations-based normative
lens. In fact, it stretches the fiction of legal knowledge to its breaking point.
(As an informal self-survey, I can attest I was unaware of any insolvency
labor entitlements until I became employed as a bankruptcy professor.)87
Rather, the labor law carve-out is for “certain social policies,” as the GP
Annex Reporters candidly admit.88 In fact, the EU Insolvency Regulation
reveals the inappositeness of expectations to its rule by saying point-blank
that the justification of the labor law carve-out is “in order to protect
employees and jobs.” 89 To be clear, pro-labor is a perfectly defensible
insolvency law policy—indeed, I have argued elsewhere for the
permissibility of such a policy-based carve-out from lex fori concursus90—
but a lex laboris carve-out cannot honestly be justified on the grounds of
protecting expectations.91 Consider: if the purpose of the carve-out is, as the
87. By contrast, I suspect most directors and officers are acutely aware of their
responsibilities—and defenses—under local law. For this reason, and for the desire to favor
“defensive” carve-outs from lex fori concursus, a reliance-based choice of law regime would
protect local officers from liability if entitled to immunity under local law regardless of COMI
law. Indeed, “presumed reliance” might even be an appropriate evidentiary standard.
88. GP Annex, supra note 15, r. 19–21 cmt. (“Based on perceived impressions of the
importance of certain social policies and on several high-profile court cases, the Reporters believe
that a rule of global application should be proposed with regard to current contracts of
employment in case of the insolvency of the employer.”).
89. EU Insolvency Regulation, supra note 2, rec. 28 (“In order to protect employees and jobs,
the effects of insolvency proceedings on the continuation or termination of employment and on
the rights and obligations of all parties to such employment must be determined by the law
applicable to the agreement in accordance with the general rules on conflict law.”).
90. Pottow, Secondary Proceedings, supra note 21, at 589.
91. The Legislative Guide gamely tries. The rationale for the lex laboris carve-out, according
to the Guide, is “protecting the reasonable expectations of employees with respect to their contract
of employment, recognizing that workers may have a relatively weaker bargaining position than
their employer, and ensuring non-discrimination amongst workers working in the same state,
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EU Insolvency Regulation intones, to protect jobs, then a COMI rule that
was more protective of employees than local insolvency law should be
enthusiastically embraced rather than subordinated by carve-out. Yet to be
theoretically consistent, one interested in protecting expectations alone
would try to “save” the local workers in such a situation by restricting them
to the more limited benefits of local law—all to vindicate their purported
expectations. I doubt many laborers would begrudge being treated
“discriminatorily” from other domestic workers by the application of more
favorable COMI law in these circumstances.92
The lex laboris rule is even more confusing when it is coupled with the
ambition of the GP Annex that priority payout not be carved out from the
application of lex fori concursus.93 This means the “insolvency effects”
carve-out from COMI law is limited to presumably such matters as ipso
facto termination of labor agreements but not—which one might predict
many employees owed back wages care about—priority distribution. 94
While I applaud this carve-out-within-a-carve-out approach (indeed, it
comports with an approach I have commended earlier), 95 it once again
seems intellectually difficult to square with a reliance-based normative
mission. Either the workers legitimately expect the application of local
law—with the full panoply of its insolvency goodies—or they do not. This
hybrid approach surely cannot be founded on a fine empirical line between
just what they do expect and what they don’t. Rather, it is a policy balance:
this is what they can rely on, but no more. Again, to belabor the point, I do
not object to this line-drawing-cum-sausage-making; my intention simply is
to underscore the tension between policy-driven compromises, such as the
current lex laboris concursus, and more normatively driven approaches, be
they animated by substantive policies (e.g., protecting employees) or more
“meta” legal principles (e.g., protecting reliance).
Employment contracts are the most politically sensitive area of
insolvency choice of law discussion, perhaps next to secured credit. 96
Accordingly, my modified universalist inclination is to defer subjugation to
whether they are employed by a local or by a foreign employer.” UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE
GUIDE, supra note 38, at 70 (emphasis added).
92. Pottow, Greed and Pride, supra note 61, at 1914 (“[W]e cannot say with certainty whether
the content of local law on its own inclines legally privileged creditors toward universalism or
territorialism; we can only say with certainty that it inclines them toward the application of the
most favorable law.”).
93. GP Annex, supra note 15, r. 20.
94. Cf. Re Collins & Aikman Europe SA, [2006] EWHC (Ch) 1343 (suggesting such priority
distributions motivate restructuring plan design).
95. Pottow, Secondary Proceedings, supra note 21, at 589.
96. See UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 38, at 131 (“[T]he relationship between
employee and employer raises some of the most difficult questions in insolvency law . . . . The
difficult question is generally the extent to which [non-insolvency statutory] provisions will have
an impact on the insolvency, raising issues that are much broader than termination of the contract
and priority of monetary claims . . . .”).
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COMI state law for as long as possible along the incrementalist path; I
would let states apply local state law to local workers as and not push the
envelope. The problem is fitting that within my normative framework. I
have two choices on how to do so (absent hypocrisy): first, I can repair to
categorical treatment and simply say that for policy reasons, labor law is
“off the table” for universalist choice of law subject to reliance-based carve-
outs. Second, I can try to shoehorn the lex laboris rules suggested thus far
into a reliance, or at least “deemed” reliance, analysis. My critique above
portends an uphill battle.97 Worse, deemed reliance drags me into the very
quagmire I criticize the British Parliament for regarding set-off
expectations. In part for that reason, I would recommend treating
employment contracts as a straight-out categorical exception—yes, a carve-
out (a meta-carve-out?)—from the approach espoused in this Article.
Especially if the carve-out does not encompass priority distribution along
the lines of the GP Annex approach, it seems justifiable on an
“extraordinary state interests” ground (i.e., control of the labor markets,
minimizing pitchfork-based uprisings, etc.). 98 Nothing precludes such a
“policy overlay” upon an otherwise reliance-based regime, especially in a
world of modified universalism.
One point of reflection in closing on this possible cop-out: a decade or
two ago, were I writing this same assessment, I would have assumed that
tax priorities fell into the same sensitive policy domain and would have to
be carved out from the lex fori concursus for political necessity.99 Now, tax
priorities are being abolished left and right; they do not even make the list
of carve-outs under many of the proposals to date.100 So some qualification
might be in order regarding my pessimism for the universalization of
employee rights. They too may change with time. But for now, discretion is
the better part of valor.
C. SECURITY INTERESTS
Rights in rem are mostly subject to a registration system, and so the
contractualist analysis above governs whether to require actual reliance on
non-COMI law in light of this registration. While of course a modified
97. See supra discussion accompanying notes 91–92.
98. Id.
99. See Barbara K. Morgan, Should the Sovereign Be Paid First? A Comparative International
Analysis of the Priority for Tax Claims in Bankruptcy, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 461, 461–62 (2000)
(asserting that a fundamental question that a country attempting to develop a bankruptcy system
must face is whether tax claims should be subject to insolvency laws and, if so, to what extent tax
claims should be afforded priority treatment); see also INT’L INSOLVENCY INST., REPORT ON TAX
CLAIMS (2005) (surveying differing national treatments of tax claims in insolvency proceedings);
cf. AM. L. INST., PRINCIPLES OF COOPERATION AMONG THE NAFTA COUNTRIES 13 (2003)
(recommending that rather than adopt parallel legislation regarding treatment of tax claims, such
claims should be the subject of an international agreement).
100. See, e.g., The Enterprise Act, 2002, § 251 (U.K.) (abolishing the priority of the Crown).
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universalist would like to subject these claims to COMI law as well (absent
actual reliance) and eliminate the carve-out—bristling at the
characterization of what is essentially a bankruptcy distribution priority as
an inviolable property right—I am less insistent, given the careful
distinctions already addressed by the Reporters and others between what
might and what might not rise to the level of truly violating “rights in rem.”
Thus, for example, a limited moratorium on the realization of the security
interest that holds the secured creditor at bay for a bit may not even be a
“violation” of rights in rem so long as the underlying lien remains
preserved. 101 If so, then the value-destructive risk of leaving secured
creditors with unfettered rights to pull the plug on a reorganization
proceeding afoot under a debtor-protective COMI law becomes less
worrisome, because the (protective) stay would escape carve-out treatment.
For non-registered charges, however, I would revert to the requirement of
demonstrating actual reliance and/or lack of knowledge of the foreign
COMI of the debtor. (Real property, for path-dependent jurisprudential
reasons, can stick with a strict lex situs rule.)102
* * *
In sum, the modified universalist following a normative framework of
reliance-based exceptions to lex fori concursus would counsel restricting
the carve-outs to demonstrated instances of actual, defensive reliance. Such
a framework could additionally accommodate, or at least not be
intellectually embarrassed by, residual carve-outs for certain extraordinary
policy categories (such as labor rights) or historically rooted categories
(such as the situs rule for real property). Finally, a reliance-based regime
could also tolerate a role for contractual choice of law selection, which may
in reality functionally eclipse any secured credit rules, if the contracts were
held in check and given presumptive, but not dispositive force, with careful
scrutiny of adverse third-party effects. Two closing comments on
administration and forum shopping seem in order. On administration: some
instances of “deemed reliance” would not be antithetical to this Article’s
normative enterprise. Perhaps creditors of a certain size or whose operations
do not transcend national borders could be deemed to have relied on local
law per se.103 American bankruptcy law has all sorts of “small potatoes”
exceptions and flatters itself still to be intellectually coherent.104 Similarly,
101. GP Annex, supra note 15, at 39 (asserting that a temporary moratorium does not interfere
with the right in rem itself but merely affects the exercising of the right).
102. Pottow, Secondary Proceedings, supra note 21, at 588–89 n.63.
103. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(51D) (2012) (defining “small business debtor”); see also Wessels,
supra note 23, at 98–99 (discussing the need for a definition of localization in Article 2(g) of the
EU Insolvency Regulation and proposing some possibilities).
104. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(8)–(9) (excepting from preference attack transactions below a certain
dollar amount).
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for policy reasons we might, or might not, want to deem individual
directors to have relied upon the defenses of local corporate law. The key
point is to countenance some sliding by through a flexible conception of
reliance for smaller fish but call the reliance bluff for other, larger, more
sophisticated creditors, who often don’t in reality truly rely on the
provisions of local law at all when dealing with an international debtor, but
rather use a choice of law arbitrage potential to gain strategic advantage.
Secondly, on forum shopping: much debate between universalism and
territorialism has centered on the ability to police or facilitate forum
shopping.105 One of the vectors of complaint has been the difficulty in
situating assets (under territorialism) and determining a debtor’s COMI
(under universalism).106 The approach of this Article—by allowing in some
instances the persistence of carve-outs—at one level is the worst of all
worlds because it requires both the situation of assets and the location of
COMI. That is, however, a necessary outcome of the pragmatics of
modified universalism.
CONCLUSION.
Choice of law in multinational bankruptcy proceedings stands at an
important crossroads. While universalism has gained an intellectual
foothold, the realities of the modern political landscape require its
deployment at present only in modified form. But the degree of how much
to “modify” universalism back into territorialism is now under discussion.
The scope and extent of COMI law carve-outs are being examined by
international institutions, such as UNCITRAL, that stand ready to advance
further reform. 107 Within these confines, this Article has proposed a
normative approach centered on reliance: rather than vague exhortations to
the importance of protecting “local creditors,” explicit requirement should
be made for actual, defensive reliance on the application of local law to the
exclusion of COMI law before a litigant may evade the lexi fori concursus.
Yet rather than be fully committed to the normative implications of this
argument—having a general rule of actual reliance cutting across all choice
of law circumstances—this Article further aligns itself with the modified
universalist project of incremental reform and prefers to build upon extant
regimes; wheel re-inventing is neither welcome nor required. As such, this
Article proposes to apply the reliance-based rule only in the subset of
instances already identified as appropriate areas for carve-out. In a similar
vein, this framework will bow to the political necessities of modified
universalism and tolerate limited policy-based categorical carve-outs to
105. Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Multinational Financial Distress: The Last Hurrah of
Territorialism, 41 TEX. INT’L L.J. 321 (2006); Lynn M. LoPucki, Global and Out of Control?, 79
AM. BANKR. L.J. 79 (2005).
106. Pottow, supra note 69.
107. Working Group V (Insolvency Law), supra note 13.
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persist, such as lex laboris. It is submitted that this new framework, with its
focus on reliance and actual legitimate expectations, in addition to enjoying
intellectual consistency, will ultimately serve a cabining effect on putative
carve-outs by reserving the application of non-COMI law only when truly
“required.” More importantly, the axis of cabining is one of principle, and
so those left behind will be hard-placed to criticize the advance (i.e., when
someone does not, in fact, rely on local law, it is hard to demand from a
moral high ground that he should nevertheless enjoy the windfall of local
law on bankruptcy distribution in a multi-jurisdictional proceeding). This
new approach to choice of insolvency law can thus further the ultimate top-
level normative goal: a truly universalist cross-border insolvency system.
